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Agency from a Stone: 









This article reads Shelley’s ‘Mont Blanc’ as an extended exploration into possible modes of relationship 
linking the human mind to the material world. The modes of relationship considered by Shelley anticipate 
many of the structures and strategies developed by posthumanist theory, including structural coupling, 
strategic anthropomorphism, imagistic translation, and human-nonhuman assemblages. After 
summarizing Kantian and post-Kantian readings of ‘Mont Blanc,’ the essay works through an extended 
close reading of the poem to elucidate its proto-posthumanist elements.  
 
Keywords: structural coupling, strategic anthropomorphism, translation, assemblage, agency 
 
 
After his first encounter with Mont Blanc in 1816, Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote to a 
friend that 
 
Mont Blanc was before us [….]  I never knew—I never imagined what mountains were 
before. The immensity of these aerial summits excited, when they suddenly burst upon the 
sight, a sentiment of ecstatic wonder, not unallied to madness. […] Nature was the poet, 
whose harmony held our spirits more breathless than the divinest.1 
 
Presenting Nature as a poet capable of holding a human spirit ‘breathless’ requires an 
anthropomorphic understanding of Nature as well as a willingness to relinquish 
anthropocentric authority—strategic moves frequently deployed by more recent 
posthumanist thinkers. But Shelley doesn’t stop with this first ‘ecstatic’ exclamation: 
the poem ‘Mont Blanc’ develops this first dumbfounded response into an extended 
meditation on the possibilities for agency and interchange between human and 
nonhuman forces. In the process, Shelley anticipates recent developments in 
posthumanist thought, such as structural coupling, strategic anthropomorphism, 
imagistic translation, and careful attentiveness to the vitality of ‘things’. In addition, the 
remarkable density of connections produced by Shelley’s poetic language and structure 






                                                 
1 Percy Bysshe Shelley, History of a Six Weeks' Tour Through a Part of France, Switzerland, Germany 
and Holland: With Letters Descriptive of a Sail Round the Lake of Geneva, and of the Glaciers of 
Chamouni (London: T. Hookham, jun., and C. and J. Ollier, 1817), 152.  





The landscape of a decentering posthumanism takes shape largely through a series of 
oppositions or objections to Kantian morality: ‘Mont Blanc’ began to chart this 
landscape two hundred years ago; contemporary philosophy is still mapping its 
contours. An overview of this landscape may help clarify the stakes of the argument. 
This section works to establish a tripartite background for the reading to follow:  
 
1) Most readings of Mont Blanc as a sublime poem are Kantian readings, assuming 
either that Shelley intends to demonstrate human power over the universe of 
things or that his attempt to privilege materiality necessarily fails. 
2) Two challenges to Kantian epistemology—systems theory and speculative 
realism—share a deconstructive approach to the poem, presenting ‘Mont Blanc’ 
as an undoing of ‘large codes of fraud and woe’.  
3) The vital materialism of Jane Bennett, based on the assemblages’ model of 
Deleuze and Guattari, has not yet been applied to ‘Mont Blanc’, but it offers a 
compelling alternative to Kantian readings of the poem and to Kantian 
anthropocentrism more generally. 
 
The short version of the story is this: it is harder than we think to let a stone be a stone.  
Just as mountaineers experience the summit receding as they draw near, so writers 
trying to base a new relation to the world on Shelley’s depiction of a mountain seem to 
lose sight of both poem and mountain as they write. If this section of the present 
argument strikes you as a false summit, glance forward to orient yourself in ‘Where, 
where, where?’ and beyond. 
 
 
Kantian Readings of Mont Blanc 
 
When it comes to the boundaries between subject and object, soul and matter, human 
and nonhuman, Kant makes a formidable gatekeeper. Kant’s account of the natural or 
dynamical sublime, for instance, builds upon Edmund Burke’s earlier version of 
sublimity but insists on ‘humanity in our person’ remaining ‘unhumiliated’. 2  Both 
Burke and Kant describe a natural sublime in which overwhelming natural force 
threatens the human subject: Kant, however, insists that the human subject remain 
safely distant from the potential threat (of an avalanche, for instance). Shelley’s ‘Mont 
Blanc’, preceded by travel writing that recapitulated many of the conventions of the 
sublime, including the threat of avalanche and rock fall, has traditionally been read as 
engaging and recapitulating the aesthetics of the sublime. Matthew Borushko offers a 
useful tour of sublime thinking in relation to ‘Mont Blanc’, but his argument presumes 
that the poem is primarily concerned to resist the violence and concealment (subreption) 
of the material world: his analysis arrives triumphantly at human mastery over that 
materiality. 3 
                                                 
2 Immanuel Kant, ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, in Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: 
Hafner, 1951), 101. 
3 Matthew Borushko, ‘The Politics of Subreption: Resisting the Sublime in Shelley’s “Mont Blanc,”’ 
Studies in Romanticism 52 (Summer 2013): 225-252. 
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Frances Ferguson offers another Kantian reading of the poem, but her analysis 
begins (correctly, I think) with Shelley’s attempt to allow the mountain its own agency.4 
Ferguson engages Earl Wasserman’s influential reading of the poem as circling around 
questions of epistemology and ontology, but argues that Shelley’s epistemology should 
be correlated not with ontology but with love. Unfortunately, in this reading, love seems 
to preclude any genuine understanding of the other. Ferguson charts a movement in the 
poem from ‘epistemological questions, questions of the poet’s understanding, to love 
language, in which all the questions are of him being understood’ (SMB, 183). The 
story of the poem, in Ferguson’s retelling, is one of unrequited love, in which Shelley 
‘is still looking for a mountain who will understand him’ (SMB,181). In Ferguson’s 
view, however, this love constitutes a categorical error. Ferguson argues that Shelley’s 
poem, despite its investment in the materiality of the mountain,  
 
[…] never allows matter to remain material but rather co-opts it or transmogrifies it by 
continually mistaking the activity of the material world for agency, by taking it to be as 
intentional as any human agency might be. Shelley insists virtually throughout the poem 
upon this confusion between activity and agency as he continually treats the mountain as a 
person. (SMB, 182-3) 
 
For Ferguson, anthropomorphizing is an unacceptable error (a judgment not all 
posthumanism theorists accept). Overall, as Louise Economides notes, in Ferguson’s 
reading, ‘Shelley’s “love” for the mountain […] amounts to a kind of dialectical 
projection, a means of asserting his own existence via an imagined antitype’. 5 The 
mountain as ‘found object’ is ‘not merely matter but matter designed by its perceiver’ 
(SMB, 183); God has been dethroned but anthropocentrism reigns serene. 
 More recent critics such as Economides, Greg Ellerman, and others have found 
Ferguson’s reading compelling but ultimately unsatisfying.6 Can we, pace Ferguson, 
move beyond Kant’s subject-object divisions without making fools of ourselves? Why 
would we want to? Both systems theory and object-oriented ontology, the latter of 
which is grounded in speculative realism, suggest that Kant’s own epistemology is 
deluded, in ways that prevent both an accurate understanding of the world and wise 





Systems theory, based on the work of Niklas Luhmann, contributes to posthumanism a 
self-reflexive and deconstructive strand of thought. Cary Wolfe, for instance, argues that 
‘the first lesson of both Derrida and Luhmann […] is that Enlightenment rationality is 
not, as it were, rational enough, because it stops short of applying its own protocols and 
commitments to itself’. 7  Systems theory participates in posthumanism’s decentering 
rejection of anthropocentrism by arguing that ‘individual human beings, or psychic 
                                                 
4 Frances Ferguson, ‘Shelley’s “Mont Blanc”: What the Mountain Said’, Romanticism and Language 202 
(1984). Rpt. Peter J. Kitson, ed., New Casebooks: Coleridge, Keats, and Shelley (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1996). Henceforth cited in text as (SMB, page number/s). 
5 Louise Economides, ‘“Mont Blanc” and the Sublimity of Materiality’, Cultural Critique 61 (2005): 103. 
Henceforth cited in text as (MBSM, page number/s).  
6 Greg Ellerman, ‘Speculative Romanticism’, SubStance 44: 1 (2015): 154-174.  
7 Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xx.  
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systems, are no longer understood to be the central agents guiding social systems, even 
though social and psychic systems co-evolve and are structurally coupled’ (MBSM, 94). 
The details of both this revised sense of agency and structural coupling deserve close 
attention.8  
 Luhmann’s systems theory breaks the very notion of human beings into separate 
systems that remain closed to one another: ‘systems of communication (social systems), 
systems of life (bodies, the brain, and so on), and systems of consciousness (minds)’.9 
Human beings don’t communicate; ‘only communication communicates’. Closure or 
autopoiesis, as defined by Chilean cognitive biologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela, is critical to Luhmann’s presentation of these systems. 10  Closure 
enables development, sophistication, complexity. If the human brain were open to all 
sensory bombardments, for instance, it would be unable to develop complex cognition.  
Operational closure is not absolute, however; systems are linked through structural 
coupling. As Luhmann puts it, 
 
One cannot imagine that a consciousness could have evolved without communication. 
Similarly, one cannot imagine that there would be meaningful communication without 
consciousness. There must have been a kind of coordination, that, because it relates to 
different forms of autopoiesis, leads, on the one hand, to an increase of complexity within 
the realm of possible mental contents and, on the other hand, within the realm of social 
communication. It seems to me that this mechanism of coupling is language.11  
 
Readings of ‘Mont Blanc’ frequently focus on the complexity of Shelley’s language in 
the poem, yet the strongest systems-theoretic readings of the poem seem to emphasize 
the deconstructive power of that language rather than its coordinating function, its role 
as a mechanism of structural coupling.   
Two recent readings of ‘Mont Blanc’ work in this self-reflexive, deconstructive 
mode: both Louise Economides and Christopher Hitt see the poem using vacancy to 
unravel a host of cultural and textual assumptions. 12  Hitt demonstrates the mind-
numbing repetition of ‘silence and solitude’ in sublime and Gothic literature in order to 
ask, ‘[w]hat would the mountain be if, instead of imagining it in terms of such cold, 
dead language, we could experience it freely, as a “vacancy”? What if “the mist of 
familiarity” did not obscure “from us the wonder of our being”?’ (SUMB, 157).  
Economides similarly sees the poem sketching ‘a domain that lies outside of 
communication systems and that exceeds human perception’, and suggests that ‘Mont 
Blanc’ asks us to question whether such silence is in fact reducible to ‘vacancy’ or 
whether it indirectly signifies a greater fullness to the world (MBSM, 108-9). These 
readings connect well with Shelley’s broader sense of poetry as that which ‘purges from 
our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of our 
being’, but they consider only the withdrawing of ‘life’s dark veil’ as if ‘Mont Blanc’ 
had no ‘figured curtain’ of its own to point us to ‘the wonder of our being’. 
                                                 
8 Literary critics draw most frequently on Luhmann’s later Art as a Social System, but it may be worth 
considering first the basic elements of Luhmann’s social systems theory. 
9 Hans-Georg Moeller, Luhmann Explained: From Souls to Systems (New York: Open Court, 2006), 9.   
10  Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of Living 
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980). 
11 Luhmann (2002): 122, quoted and translated in Moeller, 19.   
12 Christopher Hitt, ‘Shelley’s Unwriting of “Mont Blanc”’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language 47: 
2 (Summer 2005): 139-66. Henceforth cited in text as (SUMB, page number/s).  
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Systems-theoretic readings can have broad social implications, but the insistence 
on operational closure and self-reflexivity tends to turn arguments from cultural values 
and political frameworks back to a poetic pointing toward aporia. Economides, for 
instance, stresses the importance of acknowledging ‘the full extent to which material 
nature is only partially the product of our social constructions’ in order to question ‘the 
anthropocentric hubris that would sanction the complete erasure of nature as a material 
outside of culture, and the reduction of biodiversity that follows from such an ideology’. 
Working to counter the great species extinction presently occurring requires far more 
than a first step toward questioning anthropocentric hubris, as Economides would surely 
grant. But systems theory tends to turn away even from this step, back toward self-
reflection: ‘another possible response to our ecological dilemmas is to consider the 
value of communication that thematizes how the material world necessarily exceeds 
finite articulation in communication systems’ (MBSM, 99). Recognizing one’s own 
limits (communication about what exceeds communication systems) may indeed be 
‘ecologically instructive’, but the instruction is necessarily indirect. 
 Thus, while both Economides and Hitt emphasize the mountain’s legislative 
capabilities, both also highlight the poem’s emphasis on repealing rather than 
instantiating legal codes. For Economides notes that ‘[i]n deconstructive terms, what the 
mountain ‘voices’ here is (from the perspective of language) an absence that can only 
negate, repealing discursive fraud but not grounding new forms of linguistic stability’ 
(MBSM, 105-6). For Hitt, similarly,  
 
it is highly significant that the mountain itself has the capacity to repeal these codes. Or as 
Shelley puts it in a fragmentary line from his working notebook, ‘[t]he wilderness has a 
mysterious tongue / And teaches doubts—of all that words of—’ (Brinkley, 259). That is to 
say, it is the unsettling, unfathomable mystery of wilderness that prompts us to doubt the 
comfort and familiarity of words. (SUMB, 158)  
 
In these compelling and overlapping readings, Shelley uses words to make us doubt 
words; ‘Mont Blanc’ deploys linguistic codes to repeal discursive fraud and unsettle all 
linguistic stability. This kind of poetic work may help decenter readers from their 
humanist pedestals, but it does not seem to get us much closer to the mountain—or to a 
more productive sense of what poetry might do. 
 
 
Speculative Realism and OOO 
 
Luckily, object-oriented ontology (OOO) is waiting in the wings, promising to deliver 
the mountain. But can it do so? Object-oriented ontology, developed by Graham 
Harman, grows out of speculative realism, often defined in relation to the work of 
Quentin Meillassoux. 13 Both speculative realism and object-oriented ontology reject 
correlationism, defined as ‘the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from 
the other’.14 Speculative realism rejects the finitude of such Kantian correlation; object-
oriented ontology argues that finite knowledge applies not only to human knowing but 
                                                 
13 Graham Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (Ropley and Hampshire: John 
Hunt Publishing, 2010). 
14  Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2010), 5. 
 Agency from a Stone: Shelley’s Posthumanist Experiments in ‘Mont Blanc’ 33 
 
 
to all object relations. More specifically, OOO theorists work to rebalance relations 
between human and nonhuman objects by giving objects their turn on stage.   
In practice, however, speculative realism seems more concerned with philosophic 
rigor than with objects that might be known, and objects addressed through object-
oriented ontology still seem fleeting, in part because they are always ‘withdrawn’, 
inaccessible to full cognition. Timothy Morton, romanticist-turned-OOO-theorist, 
emphasizes the relevance of object-oriented ontology both to romantic studies and to 
ecological thought. His ecological thought and even his concept of hyperobjects—
objects so massively distributed in time and space that they cannot be specified in 
spatial or temporal terms—function deconstructively. For Morton, ‘the world as the 
background of events is an objectification of a hyperobject: the biosphere, climate, 
evolution, capitalism’. 15  And as Chris Washington summarizes Morton’s argument, 
‘[t]he erasure of the ‘world-as-it-is-for-us’ will subsequently grant us the leverage to 
think, and act, in the face of the literal end of the world, the potential destruction of the 
actual Earth’. As with systems-theoretic arguments and readings, erasure—or 
vacancy—opens up the potential for action that seems to be always at least somewhat 
deferred. 
Speculative realism has been invoked in recent readings of ‘Mont Blanc’ by Chris 
Washington and Greg Ellerman, but both essays seem more invested in tracing the work 
of Meillassoux and/or Morton than in grappling with ‘Mont Blanc’ per se. 16 
Washington’s essay overviews the work of Harman and Morton before offering a 
glancing reading of ‘Mont Blanc’ as exemplifying a broader ‘post-apocalyptic sublime’ 
opening out from the final question of Shelley’s poem onto the landscape considered by 
Mary Shelley’s The Last Man. Washington’s reading finds a deManian ironic duplicity 
in the ‘text’s doubled consciousness, of a world indifferent to humanity and of a world 
impoverished without humanity’ (RSR, 455-6)—which works better, it seems to me, 
with de Man’s terms of analysis than with the premises of object-oriented ontology. 
Ellerman argues that speculative realism is useful in reminding us ‘that the real gravity 
of ‘Mont Blanc’ is in its passage through correlation’s “transparent cage” to an absolute 
outside’. But while Ellerman wishes to get to the ‘great outdoors’, his reading ends by 
finding ‘power’ in linguistic contingency: ‘By insisting on their own status as mere 
words and letters – on their own fundamental meaninglessness, that is – the lines and 
marks that comprise ‘Mont Blanc’ bring into view the contingency of all things’ (SR, 
169). This insistence on contingency offers philosophic consistency, but it does not take 
me to the ‘great outdoors’, help reduce climate change or mass extinction, or even 
register the materiality of the mountain. Yet I believe, with Frances Ferguson, that 





A third strand of posthumanist thought develops out of Deleuze and Guattari’s model of 
assemblages. Jane Bennett’s account of vital materialism in her book Vibrant Matter 
                                                 
15 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 100. 
16 Chris Washington, ‘Romanticism and Speculative Reason’, in Literature Compass 12:9 (2015): 448-
460. Henceforth cited in text as (RSR, page number/s).; Greg Ellerman, ‘Speculative Romanticism’, 
SubStance 44: 1 (2015): 166. Henceforth cited in text as (SR, page number/s).  
34 Betsy Bolton 
 
 
ties this work directly to a critique of Kantian morality.17 First, she puts forward the 
Kantian argument: ‘the ontological divide between persons and things must remain least 
one have no moral grounds for privileging man over germ or for condemning pernicious 
forms of human-on-human instrumentalization (as when powerful humans exploit 
illegal, poor, young, or otherwise weaker humans)’ (ST, 12). In response, she 
acknowledges the force of this concern: ‘the framework of subject versus object has 
indeed at times worked to prevent or ameliorate human suffering and to promote human 
happiness or well-being’ (ST, 12). But she also notes that ‘the Kantian imperative to 
treat humanity always as an end-in-itself and never merely as a means does not have a 
stellar record of success in preventing human suffering or promoting human well-being’ 
and that those successes ‘come at the price of an instrumentalization of nonhuman 
nature that can itself be unethical and can itself undermine long-term human interests’ 
(ST, 12). Like Morton and Economides, Bennett worries about the unsustainability of 
the actions encouraged by our current devaluation of objects of material nature.  
Bennett’s alternative to Kantian morality requires both a revalorization of matter, 
a raising of its status, and an understanding of agency as inhering in neither humans nor 
nonhumans alone, but rather in ‘the complex interinvolvement of humans and multiple 
nonhuman actants, which together form an effective assemblage’. 18  From the 
perspective of object-oriented ontology or speculative realism, thinking in terms of 
assemblages may seem like a backwards step: Morton, for instance, insists that ‘OOO is 
realism without materialism. “Matter” is a clumsy shorthand for the unique thing that 
was carved, wrought, melted, entangled, to produce the object at hand. On this view, 
materialism is strangely ‘correlationist”’. 19  Still, while I am intrigued by Morton’s 
claims that ‘a poem is not simply a representation, but rather a nonhuman agent’ (215) 
and that ‘poetry simply is causality, pure and simple’ (216), I find Bennett’s Whitman-
influenced account of poetic texts far more compelling:  
 
Texts are bodies that can light up, by rendering human perception more acute, those bodies 
whose favored vehicle of affectivity is less wordy: plants, animals, blades of grass, 
household objects, trash. […] Poetry can help us feel more of the liveliness hidden in such 
things and reveal more of the threads of connection binding our fate to theirs.20  
 
This search for liveliness and for the threads of connection binding humans and 
nonhumans seems to me the most appropriate approach to Shelley’s proto-
posthumanism. Morton himself notes that ‘relations are from Shelley, while objects are 
from Keats’ (AOODP, 217), by which he seems to mean both that ‘relations are like 
Shelley poems: vast, complex, entangled, nonlocal, atemporal, sliding hither and thither, 
beset with irony and illusion’ and that Shelley’s poems are ‘constructivist machines for 
dissolving objectification’ (AOODP, 217). Let us consider that constructivist machinery 
as we search in ‘Mont Blanc’ for the liveliness of things, for the threads of connection 
coupling systems, lighting up bodies, binding fates.  
 
                                                 
17 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham NC: Duke UP, 2010).  
18  Gulshan Khan, ‘Agency, Nature, and Emergent Properties: An Interview with Jane Bennett’, 
Contemporary Political Theory 8:1 (2009): 101-2. 
19 Timothy Morton, ‘An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry’, New Literary History 2012, 43: 2 (Spring 
2012): 215. Henceforth cited in text as (AOODP, page number/s).  
20 Jane Bennett, ‘Systems and Things: A Response to Graham Harman and Timothy Morton’, New 
Literary History 43:2 (Spring 2012): 232. Henceforth cited in text as (ST, page number/s).  





In What is Posthumanism?, Cary Wolfe asserts that ‘when we talk about posthumanism, 
we are not just talking about a thematics of the decentring of the human in relation to 
either evolutionary, ecological, or technological coordinates […]; rather, […] we are 
also talking about how thinking confronts that thematics, what thought has to become in 
the face of those challenges’.21 The opening stanza of ‘Mont Blanc’ seems to explore 
precisely this question: what thought has to become in the face of a decentred humanity. 
Shelley asks not only how we should think but also, more unexpectedly, where we 
might think: 
 
The everlasting universe of things  
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,  
Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom—  
Now lending splendour, where from secret springs  
The source of human thought its tribute brings  
Of waters—with a sound but half its own,  
Such as a feeble brook will oft assume,  
In the wild woods, among the mountains lone,  
Where waterfalls around it leap for ever,  
Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river  
Over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves. (1-11)  
 
The universe of things takes priority here, with human thought severely humbled: 
confronted with the power of things, existing human thought is ‘feeble’ and subordinate, 
offering its waters as ‘tribute’ to the greater power of the vast universal river. Human 
thought offers gloom but has to borrow splendour. As opposed to the self-possession 
often associated with the Romantic sublime, Shelley’s image of human thought appears 
to lack full identity: its sound remains ‘but half its own’. The stanza disavows 
knowledge of where human thought might originate (the gesture at ‘secret springs’ begs 
the question). Even the present existence of human thought remains in doubt: as Frances 
Ferguson notes, we may want to ask ‘whether a brook is still a brook when a river runs 
in its channel’. Overwhelmed by thingness, mind seems to disappear under universe. So 
much for ensuring that the humanity in our person not be degraded: Kantian readings 
seem to assume that the brute materialism of this opening could only ever be a set-up 
for a subsequent take-down. 
‘Where […], where […], where […]’: the stanza makes assertions rather than 
asking questions, yet the interrogative ‘where’ recurs (as an adverb) no less than three 
times in eleven lines. The poem ostensibly opens by answering the implied question: 
‘where’ does the universe of things flow? Through the mind. But how are we to 
envision a mind through which a universe might flow? The ‘dark’ and ‘gloom’ of the 
river and its surroundings invite us to imagine the river flowing through a dark space: 
perhaps a cave, perhaps a skull. Then a comparison (‘such as’) takes us out into the 
‘wild woods,’ the open spaces of mountains and forests: this, apparently, is where the 
‘real’ river exists, outside of the mind. Once again, the assertions of the stanza and the 
brutality of the imagery—the way the lines propose to drive a raging river through the 
reader’s brain—seem to award primacy to things rather than thinking, to matter over 
mind.   
                                                 
21 Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, xvi. 
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Nevertheless, Shelley’s temporal references undermine this spatial materiality. 
Where, exactly, do waterfalls leap forever around a feeble brook? Seasonal differences 
in flow could explain the vast river raving over the rocks of the feeble brook, but those 
same differences would suggest a periodic disappearance of waterfalls during dry or 
cold seasons. ‘Ceaselessly’ creates a similar problem: if the vast river never stops raving 
over the rocks of the feeble brook, how could anyone ever know the feeble brook was 
there in the first place? Evidently, this river, too, is a river of the mind as well as a river 
of the universe: an abstraction of materiality. The metaphor insists, however, that we 
take the existence of the mind on faith: the raging river is visible; the feeble brook can 
only be imagined as having existed in some prior moment. Shelley inverts the target of 
speculative realism: instead of denying the preexistence of objects, he seems to imply a 
philosophical tenuousness, a fictionality, to any preexistence of human thought. 
 
 
Grammar and Relationship 
 
It seems necessary and impossible to rewrite the default grammar of agency, 
a grammar that assigns activity to people and passivity to things.  
—Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 119 
 
At the opening of the second stanza, Shelley pivots on the single word ‘thus’, applying 
the assertions of that opening stanza to the many descriptions to come. But do those 
assertions still apply? ‘Thus thou’ implies that the ravine is somehow the residue of the 
feeble brook, the figure of the human mind; that the ‘ceaseless motion’ that ‘pervades’ 
the ravine is somehow connected to the ‘ceaseless’ raving of the exemplary river in the 
first stanza. This implied continuity of metaphor or frame of reference is underscored by 
the speaker’s confession midway through the stanza that gazing on the ravine seems like 
musing on his own, his human mind. ‘Thus thou,’ pointing back to the first stanza, 
implies ‘Thus thou and I’. Perhaps Martin Buber is now lurking in the wings. 
Thus thou: Frances Ferguson, following Harold Bloom on the importance of 
‘thou,’ takes the pronoun as a sign of loverliness in Shelley, a romancing of the ravine 
which slides quickly into a pursuit of the indifferent mountain. Yet a ravine is not a 
mountain: more like the antithesis or inversion of a mountain. Note too the troubling 
mix of sexuality and familial narrative implied at the beginning of this second stanza.  
Where would the poet-as-suitor find his place in this ‘awful scene’?  
 
Thus thou, Ravine of Arve—dark, deep Ravine—  
[…] awful scene,  
Where Power in likeness of the Arve comes down  
From the ice-gulfs that gird his secret throne,  
Bursting through these dark mountains like the flame  
Of lightning through the tempest; —thou dost lie […] (12-19) 
 
The threat originally attributed to the ravine shifts rapidly to the river, or rather to 
‘[p]ower in likeness of the Arve’. Shelley here appears to abandon metaphor, turning to 
the capitalized abstractions of eighteenth-century allegory. But allegory rapidly exceeds 
its bounds: the glacial river (the vehicle of what might have been a feeble metaphor) is 
itself overrun by the Zeus-like associations of secret throne and lightning through the 
tempest. Water becomes fire in the imagistic excess that bursts and raves through these 
lines. And the feminized ravine lies still, thinking perhaps of England. This stanza of 
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‘Mont Blanc’ reminds us that the default grammar of agency, at least under the sign of 
sublimity, assigns activity to men and passivity to women, even when both power and 
passivity are presented as nonhuman. John Dennis, writing of the Longinian sublime, 
describes it in terms very similar to Shelley’s imagery here as ‘an invincible force which 
commits a pleasing Rape upon the very Soul of the reader; […] whenever it breaks […] 
like the Artillery of Jove, it Thunders blazes and strikes at once, and shows all the 
united force of a Writer’. 22 Edmund Burke echoes this language, asserting that the 
sublime makes (male) readers fear ‘lest this enormous strength should be employed to 
the purposes of rapine and destruction’.23 In Dennis, Burke, and here in Shelley, ‘the 
reader’s’ (alleged pleasure in) being raped positions male readers and thinkers as 
feminized and passive beneath the activity of the rhetorical and/or natural sublime. The 
Kantian sublime may insist on a triumphant return to power for human subjectivity, but 
‘Mont Blanc’ resists or at least suspends such triumph. 
 Instead, having evoked the image of rapine vis-à-vis the ravine (another dark 
pun?), Shelley turns again to the languages of domesticity and religion: 
 
—thou dost lie,  
Thy giant brood of pines around thee clinging,  
Children of elder time, in whose devotion  
The chainless winds still come and ever came  
To drink their odours, and their mighty swinging  
To hear—an old and solemn harmony. (19-24) 
 
The ejaculatory force of Power bursting through dark mountains like flame seems 
utterly inappropriate to the domesticity of the children, even the possibly adult children 
of elder time, clinging to their mother. And that domestic scene turns so rapidly to 
religious associations—one can practically hear Keats’s later ‘chained censor 
swinging’—that the implied rape vanishes before it fully appears.  
Despite the polarizing gendered separation of activity and passivity, by the end 
of this lengthy riff, Arve and ravine are nearly indistinguishable, closely allied in an 
account that could be seen as preempting the structural coupling of cognitive biology 
and systems theory. The sound patterns create a kind of standing wave that both unifies 
and holds separate the Arve and the ravine, the ravine-mind and the human-mind: 
 
Thy caverns echoing to the Arve’s commotion— 
A loud, lone sound no other sound can tame;  
Thou art pervaded with that ceaseless motion,  
Thou art the path of that unresting sound. (30-33) 
 
In these echoing caverns, ‘loud’ expands into ‘sound’ which echoes twice; ‘thou art,’ 
‘thou art,’ offers another echo, even as the Arve’s ‘commotion’ is repeated as ‘motion’. 
‘Pervaded’ rather than ‘invaded’ by ceaseless motion, the ravine becomes neither the 
destination nor the source of ‘that unresting sound’, but rather a path for that sound to 
travel elsewhere. In the process, the ravine also seems to expand, becoming more than 
the physical bed of the river. Where does the sound travel? The History may offer a 
gloss: 
                                                 
22 John Dennis, The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (London: George Strahan and Bernard Lintott, 1704), 
79. 
23 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. 
James T. Boulton (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1968), 65. 




the ravine, clothed with gigantic pines, and black with its depth below, so deep that the very 
roaring of the untameable Arve, which rolled through it, could not be heard above—all was 
as much our own, as if we had been the creators of such impressions in the minds of others 
as now occupied our own.24  
 
The ravine/ the sublime belongs to its perceivers to the extent that those perceivers 
make others perceive what ravages them, but Shelley here performs a reverse 
subreption, claiming ownership of the ravine before (or in the act of) creating or 
implanting those impressions in the mind of his reader(s). In the poem as well as the 
travel letter, Nature and poet operate according to the same principles: the two are 
difficult to distinguish—as the stanza promptly acknowledges. 
 
Dizzy Ravine! and when I gaze on thee  
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange  
To muse on my own separate fantasy,  
My own, my human mind, which passively  
Now renders and receives fast influencings,  
Holding an unremitting interchange  
With the clear universe of things around. (34-40) 
 
Operational closure separates the human-mind from the ravine-mind, but structural 
coupling through language and poetry brings them into ‘interchange’. The ‘universe of 
things’ is back, but no longer as either a raging river or a Jove-like Power of thunder 
and lightning. With explicit acknowledgement of the human mind’s ‘passivity’, that 
universe (now clear rather than dark or glittering) has become a trading partner involved 
in ‘unremitting interchange’, or perhaps an evolutionary partner involved in symbiotic 
inter-change—a process of transformation situated between mind and universe that 
might change both mind and universe.  
 Where, where, where does this interchange happen? Back in the dark and the 
ghostly shadows, ‘in the still cave of the witch Poesy’. 
 
One legion of wild thoughts, whose wandering wings  
Now float above thy darkness, and now rest  
Where that or thou art no unbidden guest,  
In the still cave of the witch Poesy,  
Seeking among the shadows that pass by  
Ghosts of all things that are, some shade of thee,  
Some phantom, some faint image; till the breast  
From which they fled recalls them, thou art there! (41-48) 
 
Shelley’s grammar in these lines deforms what we might take to be the default grammar 
of relationship and agency. Pronouns are particularly opaque: as Shelley notes in his 
fragmentary ‘On Life’,  
 
The words I, you, they, are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the 
assemblage of thoughts thus indicated […]. The words I, and you, and they are grammatical 
devices invented simply for arrangement, and totally devoid of the intense and exclusive 
sense usually attached to them. […] We are on that verge where words abandon us, and 
                                                 
24 Shelley, History of a Six Weeks’ Tour Through a Part of France, Switzerland, Germany and Holland, 
152. 
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what wonder if we grow dizzy to look down the dark abyss of how little we know! The 
relations of things remain unchanged, by whatever system.25   
 
Shelley’s prose stresses assemblage, arrangement, relationship—connections that his 
poetry performs. We may well grow dizzy, looking down on the dark and dizzying 
ravine and grasping at pronouns: ‘that’, ‘thou’, and ‘they’ are there, evidently. Where? 
The close of the stanza asserts that as long as the poet’s wild thoughts seek for the 
ravine in poetry’s shadows, the ravine is present with those wild thoughts in the cave of 
poetry. These lines anticipate Luhmannian structural coupling as a juxtaposition that 
resists superimposition.26 Where Luhmann sees language as the mechanism that allows 
the structural coupling of cognition and communication, Shelley presents language and 
poetry as a mechanism that allows the inter-change of mind and universe. Despite the 
adjectival assertion, however, that mechanism is not entirely ‘clear’. One might wonder 
what it means to be a ‘bidden guest’—if one obeys another’s bidding, does that not 
make one a subordinate rather than a guest? The stanza’s last lines invite a different 
query: If there are no wild thoughts present in the cave of poetry to perceive a ravine (or 
a universe), can the ravine be present? Where does the ravine go when the speaker’s 
breast recalls its legion of wild thoughts? Shelley glances at a conundrum that would 
invert the not-yet-invented puzzle of Schroedinger’s cat.  
 
 
Anthropomorphism and Love 
 
Where are we, then, at the beginning of the third stanza? Wrapped in sleep, or perhaps 
with Schroedinger’s cat? Are we alive or dead? The stanza opens with yet another 
strophic turn, combining the passivity of sleep imagery with a series of words and 
images otherwise associated with Mont Blanc and with Power. Readings of 
intertextuality in ‘Mont Blanc’ tend to focus on precursor and contemporary texts—the 
failing spirit and the homeless cloud evoking Wordsworth, for instance—but the poem 
also cites itself obsessively. The phrase ‘[g]leams of a remoter world’ seems to point 
forward to Mont Blanc which first appears remotely in the middle of this stanza, ‘far, 
far above’ and later (in stanza 5) ‘yet gleam[ing] on high’ (127). Therefore, is it Mont 
Blanc (perhaps also known as ‘Power in likeness of the Arve’) that visits the soul in 
sleep? Is the soul in sleep the same as the human-mind and ravine-mind being affected 
by ‘the strange sleep/ Which when the voices of the desert fail/ Wraps all in its own 
deep eternity’? If ‘death is slumber’, is this earlier deep eternity also death? Is the ‘I’ 
that ‘lies’ here the same as that associated with the ravine that ‘dost lie’ beneath sublime 
violence in the second stanza? The fourth stanza will assert that ‘Power dwells apart in 
its tranquillity, / Remote, serene, and inaccessible’ (96-7) suggesting again that Power 
and Mont Blanc are both associated with ‘the mightier world of sleep’ that spreads 
‘inaccessibly/ Its circles’. These verbal echoes within the poem, not dissimilar from the 
commotion of the Arve echoing within the ravine, create a paradoxical portrait in which 
Power appears as Jove-like thunder and lightning when it descends ‘in likeness of the 
Arve’, but as slumber and tranquillity when at home in its remoter world. The antitheses 
coexist in a (loosely considered) quantum uncertainty encoding too much information. 
                                                 
25 Shelley, ‘On Life’, in The Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley in Verse and Prose, ed. H. Buxton Forman 
(London: Reeves and Turner, 1880), 8 vols., 6: 157. 
26 For a different reading, see MBSM, 105.  
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In this uncertain, data-rich, paradoxical context, Mont Blanc first appears, as 
supreme (and notably ungendered) materiality, absolute monarch of ‘subject mountains’ 
who pile ‘their unearthly forms’ around it. The rhyme scheme pairs opposites—steeps 
and deeps; a peak that is ‘serene’, with ‘broad vales between’—as the stanza shudders 
forward, jerking back and forth against the task of describing ‘unearthly forms’ and 
‘shapes’. Dashes point out an interjection that restarts the effort of description: 
 
  —how hideously  
Its shapes are heap’d around! rude, bare, and high,  
Ghastly, and scarr’d, and riven.— (69-71) 
 
The intimacy of ‘thou’ and ‘thy’ seems far removed from this uninhabitable desert, this 
hideous object of description—but no sooner have we worked our way through this 
heap of abstract adjectives than domesticity arrives amid further uncertainty: 
 
—Is this the scene  
Where the old Earthquake-daemon taught her young  
Ruin? Were these their toys? or did a sea  
Of fire envelop once this silent snow? (71-3) 
 
The stanza seems to pause in expectation of an answer. We have to be reminded that 
‘None can reply—all seems eternal now’ (75), in a phrase that returns us to the ‘deep 
eternity’ associated with strange sleep and thus with death as slumber. If the second 
stanza echoed the sexualized language of the sublime as rape, juxtaposed with an 
account of children clinging to their mother, here we have a single mother working to 
raise children who might live up to their capacity for ruin.   
What do we make of this Earthquake-daemon? As with the ravine, where the 
speaker notes the narcissism of seeming to see his mind in the landscape, Shelley 
carefully constrains the anthropomorphism with the form of the question. The poet does 
not tell us that the foothills of Mont Blanc are the toys of Earthquake children; rather, he 
wonders aloud, seeking ‘some phantom, some faint image’ of what could have created 
this scene. And Shelley’s specific language here suggests that anthropomorphism can 
transform human affective response to what seems utterly alien: ‘hideously’ and 
‘ghastly’ imagery here gives way to that of children’s toys in the space of a line and a 
half.   
 Pace Ferguson, Shelley begins by noting the impossibility of an answer to his 
questions, though that lack of a reply perversely seems to produce an assertion that a 
reply is possible. And the imagined reply moves into a religious and political realm, 
leaving the family scene far behind: 
 
The wilderness has a mysterious tongue  
Which teaches awful doubt, or faith so mild,  
So solemn, so serene, that man may be,  
But for such faith, with Nature reconcil’d;  
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal  
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood  
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good  
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel. (76-83) 
 
The two claims are yoked by a semi-colon, inviting us to see the ‘mysterious tongue’ of 
the wilderness shaping the ‘voice’ of the mountain—but the result is oddly 
 Agency from a Stone: Shelley’s Posthumanist Experiments in ‘Mont Blanc’ 41 
 
 
anticlimactic. Shelley’s published ‘but for such faith’ revises the earlier, unpublished 
but simpler formulation (‘man may be / In such faith, with Nature reconcil’d’) in ways 
that make reconciliation harder to achieve. But even as faith blocks reconciliation, the 
speaker urges reconciliation more fervently, through a more intimate address: in the 
second clause, it is the mountain rather than the ravine that is suddenly ‘thou,’ an 
intimate addressee. Ferguson would say that Shelley is trying to get the mountain to 
notice him. But Jane Bennett sees anthropomorphism as a critical tool for re-valuing 
materiality and acknowledging the creative agency of nonhuman actors. 27  While 
Ferguson sees Shelley looking for love in all the wrong places, we might also see 
Shelley self-consciously struggling to overcome a Kantian subject/object divide, trying 
to strike a chord between person and thing in the face of a fundamental rift.  
What follows from that rift may be more ruinous for humankind than for 
materiality. The most hopeful readings of this passage are given by Hitt and 
Economides, who both note that the voice of the mountain has here the power to repeal, 
but not to create, legal codes. But it is also worth asking why Shelley backs away from 
what appears to be the poem’s central claim here. This sequence categorizes human 
virtue (wise, great, good) in an apparent descent, and the very form of the divided list is 
worrying. By the time he writes The Triumph of Life (1822), Shelley will wonder why 
‘God made irreconcilable/ Good and the means of good’; the divisions of subject and 
verb in this stanza already point toward an ethical self-division. At the midpoint of the 
poem, the third stanza seems to gesture towards the great potential of what political 
ecologists such as Bruno Latour have envisioned as a ‘new collective’, even as it re-




To recapitulate: at the opening of the fourth stanza, we have worked our way from a 
river that makes the preexistence of human thought seem a fiction (as practitioners of 
OOO would argue), through a ravine-mind that reflects human-mind while shadows of 
each dreamily meet in the cave of the witch Poesy (enacting the structural coupling of 
cognitive biology and systems theory), to a mountain that seems to represent both death 
and the summit of earthly desires for reconciliation (political ecology), both a 
consummation devoutly to be wished and the vanishing point of a perspectival drawing 
(as in the withdrawal of the object in OOO). And we have travelled this route via 
different modes of anthropomorphism working to show us (à la Jane Bennett’s vibrant 
matter) the liveliness of less wordy beings. 
Can we actually experience the voice of the mountain as a partner in a new 
collective? In the fourth stanza, the poet, gazing on the mountain, implicitly bids it 
speak through his own voice. As the lines of the stanza seek for a dwelling place, 
replaying words and images already canvassed, the mountain’s voice may rest, with our 
wild thoughts, in the cave of Poesy. The fourth stanza turns back from questions to 
assertions, back to the kind of descriptive clauses and tenuous grammatical connections 
we saw in the second stanza. 
  
The fields, the lakes, the forests, and the streams,  
                                                 
27 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 120. 
28 See for instance Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. 
Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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Ocean, and all the living things that dwell  
Within the daedal earth; lightning, and rain,  
Earthquake, and fiery flood, and hurricane,  
The torpor of the year when feeble dreams  
Visit the hidden buds, or dreamless sleep  
Holds every future leaf and flower; the bound  
With which from that detested trance they leap;  
The works and ways of man, their death and birth,  
And that of him and all that his may be;  
All things that move and breathe with toil and sound  
Are born and die; revolve, subside, and swell. (84-95) 
 
Grammatical groupings strain at the seams, exceeding their boundaries. If you were 
asked to summarize the meaning of this passage, the obvious move would be to jump to 
the last two lines: the rest exceed requirements. And even the last two lines contain 
unnecessary material: ‘toil and sound’ interrupt the forward motion of the lines, making 
them hard to read. Toil and sound—the twinned heart of poetry—together distract from 
the basic concept that ‘all things that move and breathe are born and die’. Of course, one 
could argue that distraction—poetry—toil and sound—is the point here. Shelley’s list of 
all things that move and breathe is an epic ekphrasis: a (massive) microcosm of the 
world, replaying Hesiod’s Works and Days as the works and ways of man. Resisting his 
own rude and bare and ghastly summary, Shelley reverses the traditional sequence of 
birth and death (‘death and birth’) and adds a cadence, one that may even attempt to 
reverse entropy, as all things ‘revolve, subside, and swell’.  
After the daedal ekphrasis of the stanza’s opening comes an assertion of 
separation that the remainder of the stanza will undercut: ‘Power dwells apart in its 
tranquillity/ Remote, serene, and inaccessible’ (96-7). The adjective ‘serene’ glances 
back at the third stanza’s ‘faith so solemn, / So serene’ that it blocks the reconciliation 
of man and nature, while ‘remote’ replays the ‘remoter world’ whence dreams visit 
human sleepers. Dwelling apart, this inaccessible Power seems to maintain and 
underscore existing theology and divisions. Yet the very next claim asserts the 
possibility of connection through attention or education: 
 
And this, the naked countenance of earth,  
On which I gaze, even these primeval mountains  
Teach the adverting mind. (98-100) 
 
This third appearance of the verb ‘to teach’ shifts the focus of instruction. When the 
poem speculated about old Earthquake-daemon teaching ruin to her young, ‘ruin’ 
operated a little oddly as a curricular course of study. Immediately afterwards, the 
mysterious tongue of the wilderness more solemnly appeared to teach either awful 
doubt or solemn faith: again, one could imagine an entire course of study in sceptical 
philosophy or Anglican theology. But in these lines, the naked countenance of earth 
evokes a response that blurs subject-object divisions: here, the ‘adverting mind’ may be 
either the indirect object of the sentence (the mountains teach whom?) or perhaps the 
direct object (the mountains teach what? to advert, to turn to the primeval earth).  
Once the adverting mind appears, the stable divisions that maintain Power apart 
in its tranquillity seem to vanish. Object-oriented ontology as propounded by Timothy 
Morton suggests that objects can only translate one another, and the fourth stanza 
proposes a series of translations through simile and metaphor. Glaciers creep ‘like 
snakes’, their formations become ‘many a precipice’ shaped as 




dome, pyramid, and pinnacle,  
A city of death, distinct with many a tower  
And wall impregnable of beaming ice (102-6) 
 
all paradoxically and anthropomorphically constructed by ‘Frost and the Sun in scorn of 
mortal power’. Abstract Power apparently dwells in a city of death shaped by religion 
(Egyptian pyramids, the domes and pinnacles of cathedrals and mosques) and war 
(towers and impregnable walls) to which mortal power can only aspire. Yet this likeness 
is neither fixed nor stable: no sooner named than translated into another form.  
 
Yet not a city, but a flood of ruin  
Is there, that from the boundaries of the sky  
Rolls its perpetual stream; vast pines are strewing  
Its destin’d path, or in the mangled soil  
Branchless and shatter’d stand; the rocks, drawn down  
From yon remotest waste, have overthrown  
The limits of the dead and living world,  
Never to be reclaim’d. (107-14) 
 
So much for Power’s remote inaccessibility. We are back amid the relationships implied 
by the first stanza, but they appear through a mirror darkly, revised into something like 
this apocalyptic assertion: an everlasting flood of ruin overthrows the limits of death 
and life. Power in its remoteness seems to be chucking rocks at the living world; the 
children of Earthquake-daemon have learned their lessons well. As subsequent lines 
make clear, erasing the boundary between death and life does not serve the interests of 
the living: ‘so much of life and joy is lost’ (117). A flood of ruin claims the ‘dwelling’ 
and the ‘place’ of men and of ‘insects, beasts, and birds’ as ‘its spoil’ (115), though the 
glaciers have little obvious use for either food or retreat. As ‘the race/ Of man flies far 
in dread’, it lacks the serenity to ‘advert’ to the ‘naked countenance of earth’. The 
perpetual stream of ruinous change, the ceaseless vulnerability of the living: these 
contingencies make it nearly impossible to replace the Wordsworthian ‘faith that looks 
through death’ or acquire the ‘philosophic mind’ of the Intimations Ode. 
 However, the conclusion of the stanza does appear to look through death by 
turning death back into life, transforming the linear flood of ruin back into the cyclical 
natural patterns described in the stanza’s opening account of the ‘daedal earth’. Human 
thought and imaginative power return at this point of transformation, as the phrasing 
evokes the Coleridge not of ‘Hymn before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni’ with 
whom Shelley has been arguing, but rather of the unpublished imaginative tour-de-force 
‘Kubla Khan’.   
 
Below, vast caves  
Shine in the rushing torrents’ restless gleam,  
Which from those secret chasms in tumult welling  
Meet in the vale, and one majestic River,  
The breath and blood of distant lands, for ever  
Rolls its loud waters to the ocean-waves,  
Breathes its swift vapours to the circling air. (120-6) 
 
The first stanza gestured at the secret springs of human thought; here, that feeble 
tributary has swelled to ‘rushing torrents’ from ‘secret chasms in tumult welling’. Mind 
and river seem to meet in the vale, reaching out alike to the ocean and the circling 
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waves. The act of breathing reinscribes a kind of structural coupling of mind and 
material world, as long as one accepts ‘distant lands’ as synecdoche for the human and 
nonhuman life supported by all the ecoservices provided by the majestic River. Mind 
and river together support ‘the breath and blood of distant lands’ even as the vapours 
exhaled by the river point toward a nonhuman water cycle of transpiration and 
evaporation into the ‘circling air’. Perhaps the human mind can roll along with the 
universe of things; perhaps rather than being destroyed by a flood of ruin, we can turn to 
the naked countenance of earth and start to see the interrelatedness of death and life, 
along with their cyclical patterns of renewal. 
 
 
Agency from a Stone  
 
While the first stanza of ‘Mont Blanc’ focused obsessively on the adverbial ‘where, 
where, where’ of human thought and human-nonhuman encounter, the poem’s final 
stanza offers its own repetitive tolling of location: there, there, there. However, despite 
the apparent insistence on separation, the question implied by this stanza highlights 
connection and outreach: how can the human mind reach the ‘there’ of materiality? 
What would be the inverse of the universe of things flowing through the human mind?   
 
Mont Blanc yet gleams on high:—the power is there,  
The still and solemn power of many sights,  
And many sounds, and much of life and death. (127-9)  
 
Such separation offers no traction, no imaginative transport to the human mind. This 
opening sounds like a bored museum docent gesturing vaguely at a collection: here you 
have our many sights, and many sounds, and much of life and death. If the wise, the 
great and the good are to interpret, make felt, and deeply feel the voice of the mountain, 
they are going to have to do better than this.  
 To make us feel the mountain, Shelley evokes multiple senses, setting a varied 
scene of shifting weather and times of day. This stanza replaces eternal time with some 
of the variation possible on this ‘daedal earth,’ and the dominant action—the snows 
descending—closes the water cycle suggested at the end of the preceding stanza: 
 
In the calm darkness of the moonless nights,  
In the lone glare of day, the snows descend  
Upon that Mountain; none beholds them there,  
Nor when the flakes burn in the sinking sun,  
Or the star-beams dart through them. Winds contend  
Silently there, and heap the snow with breath  
Rapid and strong, but silently! (130-6) 
 
This description moves beyond the generality of ‘many sights, and many sounds,’ but 
only to cast doubt upon that opening description, since no one is there to see the snow, 
and the action occurs silently. The awkward repetition of ‘silently’—in its second 
appearance, the adverbial form only makes sense applied back to the verb ‘heap’ even 
though the word appears as if a continuation of the adjectives describing ‘breath’—
underscores its importance. And the anthropomorphism of the winds heaping the snow 
with their breath does so little to humanize either wind or snow that the rhetorical 
gesture is itself muted. Shelley unsubtly contradicts the third stanza’s anthropomorphic 
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insistence on the mountain’s voice. The thunderous appearance of Power in likeness of 
the Arve is similarly silenced in this conclusion; instead,  
 
Its home  
The voiceless lightning in these solitudes  
Keeps innocently, and like vapour broods  
Over the snow. (136-9) 
 
Instead of water bursting like flame in the second stanza, here the voiceless lightning 
broods like vapour. In lieu of the dwelling places of insects and animals (including 
humans) destroyed in the previous stanza, Shelley here sketches the ‘home’ of lightning 
and the habitation of ‘the secret Strength of things’. Thematically, the poem is still 
working to imagine geological processes and attend to the geological determining 
causes of human life: the consequence of the heaped snow, we recognize now, will 
include the destruction brought by the moving glacier becoming the productive river, 
the ‘breath and blood of distant lands’.  
Why then the insistent obscurity of the poem’s concluding assertion and 
rhetorical question? By laying out a puzzle rather than making a straightforward 
assertion, Shelley engages his readers in interpreting (and making felt and deeply 
feeling) the voice of the mountain. Explicit references to secrecy need not be treated 
with excess reverence. ‘The secret Strength of things / Which governs thought, and to 
the infinite dome / Of Heaven is as a law’ might be relatively simply glossed as physical 
law, or a set of scientific generalizations based upon empirical observation. In ‘Mont 
Blanc,’ the adverting mind watches snows descend to form glaciers and then follows the 
path of the glacier to see it produce both destruction and life-giving breath and 
transpiration. The laws of the physical universe govern thought and define what we can 
imagine of heaven’s ‘infinite dome’—but human imagination is deeply bound up in the 
articulation of those physical laws. 
 
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea,  
If to the human mind's imaginings  
Silence and solitude were vacancy? (142-5) 
 
This closing question has been read both as an assertion of the human mind’s 
triumphant mastery over mountain, earth, stars and seas, and as a more sceptical open 
question. I want to insist once again on the importance of connection in this conclusion 
to the poem: I see the closing assertion and question as a rhetorical assemblage 
mimicking the human-nonhuman collective Shelley has been struggling to create and 
describe throughout the poem. The Ravine, the Arve, the mountain and the mind all 
come together in this poem dedicated to transforming our sense of political agency and 




Shelley’s proto-posthumanist poem works to expand the circle of human discourse and 
consideration to include nonhumans—and carefully considers the challenge to human 
thinking that this expansion poses. ‘Mont Blanc’ experiments with many of the 
strategies taken up by various recent proponents of posthumanist thought: decentering, 
structural coupling, grammatical deformation, anthropomorphism, translation, and 
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more. Shelley’s first stanza, driving the universe of things as a raging river through the 
human mind, drastically displaces human thought and agency, unseating humanist 
assumptions of centrality. The second stanza of ‘Mont Blanc’ dismisses the violent 
heterosexism inherent in the Romantic sublime and develops instead a tale of structural 
coupling in which the shadowy cave of poetry allows the human mind to encounter not 
only its solipsistic self but also the universe of things. The third stanza challenges the 
value and meaning of that point of interchange by exploring the boundaries of vitality 
(sleep, death, dream) and working to imagine, through carefully framed 
anthropomorphism, the political agency of a mountain. Stepping back from this 
anthropomorphism, the fourth stanza shifts the poem’s focus from ‘codes’ and 
pronouncements to object-oriented translations and process: rather than the preceding 
options of ruin, awful doubt or serene faith, attention (the ‘adverting mind’) may be all 
the wilderness can teach. Finally, the last stanza, recuperating ruin with habitation and 
replacing voice with adverbial silence, requires a radical reimagining of human-
nonhuman agency and collaboration. The dense patterning of Shelley’s language in 
‘Mont Blanc’ allows the poem to engage each of these strategies in considerable depth 
and complexity, highlighting various points of overlap and difference in recent 
posthumanist scholarship. Nevertheless, the poem, like the mountain, teaches us that the 
most important and most challenging step is perhaps the first: to ad-vert, to turn to the 
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Instanţe [agency] ale unei pietre [stone]. 




Acest articol tratează poemul lui Shelley ,,Mont Blanc” ca pe o explorare extinsă spre posibile relații care 
leagă mintea umană de lumea materială. Aceste relații pe care Shelley le-a stabilit anticipează multe 
structuri și strategii dezvoltate ulterior de teoria postumanistă, incluzînd cuplarea structurală, strategii 
antropomorfice, traducerea imagistică, și asamblarea uman-non-uman. După rezumarea lecturilor 
kantiene și postkantiene ale poeziei ,,Mont Blanc”, articolul propune o lectură nouă prin care autoarea 
descoperă elemente proto-postumaniste.  
 
